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Public law in the tax tribunals and the case for reform 
Stephen Daly* 
Abstract 
The central thesis of this article is that, first, the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax 
Tribunal to deal with typical public law complaints is limited; secondly, that the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal should be broadened, as this would be more efficient and 
the Tribunal judges have the experience and ability to deal with such matters.  
Introduction 
Consider the following example. A taxpayer has an assessment issued against her by 
HMRC. Her argument is that the tax is not due under the relevant taxing provision, or 
in the alternative that she is entitled to rely upon Extra-Statutory Concession (ESC) 
A19 which provides that HMRC will “give up” tax due where the body has failed to 
make timely use of information supplied by the taxpayer.1 In such a case, the taxpayer 
will have to institute two separate proceedings. In one, she will appeal against the 
assessment to the First-tier Tribunal.2 In the second, she will institute judicial review 
proceedings in the Administrative Court claiming a legitimate expectation that she 
was entitled to rely upon ESC A19 (or that HMRC’s decision not to apply the 
concession was irrational).3 This situation is entirely unsatisfactory. The result in 
either of the proceedings may render the other redundant, with the effect being a 
waste of the time and money of all concerned. In such a case, why should the expertly 
constituted First-tier Tax Tribunal not have the capacity to resolve both disputes?  
This article seeks to demonstrate that the underlying restriction is unjustified. 
Further, there are considerable practical benefits to extending the ambit of the First-
tier Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The article will propose that taxpayers should be allowed 
to bring public law issues before the First-tier Tribunal where there is additionally a 
substantive dispute. The Tribunal is the best placed forum for resolving such cases. 
                                                 
* Lecturer at the University of Birmingham. The author would like to thank Dr John Avery Jones, Dr 
Paul Daly, Ruth Kennedy and the two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of the piece. Different iterations also benefitted from comments of those attending the annual SLSA 
Conference and the 5th Annual TARC workshop, and in particular from the comments of Professors 
Peter Cane, Richard Kirkham, Robert Thomas, Jason Latham of HM Courts and Tribunals and Judges 
Nick Wikeley and Nick O’Brien at an early career workshop on administrative justice at the University 
of Sheffield. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 HMRC, Extra-Statutory Concessions: ex-Inland Revenue (6 April 2017), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extra-statutory-concessions-ex-inland-revenue [Accessed 
31 December 2017]. 
2 Note that the taxpayer is entitled to ask for an internal review whereby the decision is reviewed by 
somebody who was not involved in the original assessment before proceeding to appeal to the tribunal. 
On which, see: Taxes Management Act 1970, ss. 49A-49I. 
3 It should however be noted that as judicial review is a remedy of last resort, a taxpayer will often first 
be required to seek an internal review and perhaps even approach the Adjudicator’s Office. On this, 
see: R. (on the application of NCM 2000 Ltd) v HMRC [2015] EWHC 1342 (Admin), at [51]-[59] and 
also R. (on the application of Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] 
EWCA Civ 1716 at [51]-[71]; [2017] WLR(D) 723 (Sales LJ). 
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This proposal develops upon a similar proposal first aired almost a quarter of a 
century ago by Dr John Avery Jones.4  
The article is set out in three parts. The first briefly will set out the current 
position in terms of bringing public law claims in the tribunals. The second thereafter 
will set out the case for extending the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax Tribunal. The 
third part will examine the options for reform. Finally, it should be noted that this 
article will only assess the viability of extending the First-tier Tax Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, though a similar argument could be made for reforming the jurisdiction 
of other tribunals.  
The Current Position 
As a general rule, public law issues must be argued by way of judicial review in the 
courts, rather than the tax tribunals. The reason for this is that the tribunals are 
creatures of statute, whereas judicial review is grounded in the “ancient and inherent 
supervisory jurisdiction of the court”.5 If the tribunals are to have any jurisdiction to 
hear public law issues accordingly, this can only be where it has been granted by 
Parliament. There is provision for the tribunals to consider public law matters in 
certain specified circumstances. For the most part, this arises only in the case of the 
Upper Tribunal, which was made a superior court of record by the governing 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007), thereby having 
jurisdiction equivalent to that of the High Court. For instance, litigants may apply to 
the Administrative Court to have their Judicial Review case heard by the Upper 
Tribunal.6 The Administrative Court must be satisfied that transferring the case would 
be “just and convenient”.7 There are instances also where the First-tier Tribunal may 
hear public law issues, provided there is jurisdiction statutorily conferred, as further 
examined below.8  
For a time, it seemed possible that a broad reading of the legislative provisions 
could prevail, allowing for a greater range of public law issues to be considered by the 
First-tier Tribunal. In Oxfam v HMRC (Oxfam),9 Mr Justice Sales (as he then was) 
considered that the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal to hear public law claims was 
broader than previously understood. Sales J discussed at length the issue of bringing 
legitimate expectation claims before the First-tier Tribunal.10 He held that the 
Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear the public law claim. This was justified by 
reference to the statutory scheme. The relevant provision allowing for appeal in the 
case, section 83(c) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 provided that “an appeal shall 
lie to a tribunal with respect… to the amount of any input tax which may be credited 
to a person”. This gave the Tribunal a broad jurisdiction to consider any legal 
question, including a public law question, capable of being determinative of the issue 
                                                 
4 J. F. Avery Jones, “Tax appeals: the case for reform” (1994) BTR 3, 13. See also: Committee on 
Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments (Cmnd 8822, 1983), at [25.4.13] onwards. 
5 C. Turpin and A, Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 7th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 661. 
6 See generally TCEA 2007, ss. 15-21. 
7 Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31A(3); TCEA 2007, s. 19(1). 
8 See below, “Competence of the First-tier Tribunal”, in text at n 37 onwards. 
9 Oxfam v HMRC [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) [73], [2010] STC 686. The decision on jurisdiction has 
been followed in its immediate aftermath. See for instance Hanover Company Services Ltd v Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners [2010] UKFTT [27]-[42] (TCC), [2010] SFTD 1047 1054-1060. 
10 Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) at [61]-[79].  
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of the amount of input tax which should be credited to a taxpayer.11 Such an 
interpretation was defensible on the basis that the Tribunal is particularly well 
positioned to make judgments about the fair treatment of taxpayers by HMRC and it 
avoids the cost, delay and potential injustice and confusion associated with 
proliferation of proceedings.12 Parliament would plausibly have had in mind avoiding 
these issues when drafting the provision.13 
The reasoning of Sales J aligns broadly with that of the Supreme Court in the 
subsequent case of R. (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal (Cart).14 The 
Court there took a broad reading of TCEA 2007 in order to develop a means of 
judicially reviewing decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Although the statute states that 
the Upper Tribunal is a superior court of record,15 the Court held that this did not 
preclude judicial review of its decisions. In terms of the mechanics of such judicial 
review, the Court used the language of TCEA 2007 to develop a novel, pragmatic 
(although doctrinally empty)16 approach that the courts ought to take.17 The Court 
justified the invention inter alia by reference to the need to spare judicial resources.18 
To this end, the judgment supports Sales J’s assessment in Oxfam in that having two 
proceedings dealing with effectively the same issue is a poor use of judicial resources 
and hence contrary to the intention of Parliament.19  
The Supreme Court judgment in Cart however was not mentioned in Noor v 
HMRC,20 which has in practice been taken to have restricted considerably the scope 
of Sales J’s judgment. The Upper Tribunal there also considered the issue as to 
whether the First-tier Tribunal could hear issues of public law and powerfully 
responded to Oxfam. The judgment is particularly significant as it was handed down 
by the (then) President of the Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber, Mr Justice 
Warren, and President of the First-tier Tribunal Tax Chamber, Judge Bishopp. The 
Upper Tribunal rejected Sales J’s analysis. If Parliament had intended to allow the 
Tribunal to consider public law issues in such a manner, it would have expressly done 
so and subjected this to specific conditions, as it did in the case of the Upper 
Tribunal.21 This reasoning has found support in differently constituted panels of the 
Upper Tribunal subsequently.22 Although not expressly rejecting Oxfam, the Court of 
                                                 
11 Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), at [63]. 
12 Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), at [70]. 
13 Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), at [70]. 
14 R. (on the application of Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2011] MHLR 196. 
15 TCEA 2007, s. 3(5). 
16 M. Elliott and R. Thomas, “Tribunal justice and proportionate dispute resolution” (2012) 71(2) CLJ 
297, 309; M. Elliott and R. Thomas, “Cart and Eba—the new tribunals system and the courts”, UK 
Constitutional Law Blog (5 October 2011), available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/10/05/mark-elliott-and-robert-thomas-cart-and-
eba%E2%80%94the-new-tribunals-system-and-the-courts/ [Accessed 31 December 2017]. 
17 On which see Cart, above fn. 14, [2011] UKSC 28 at [128]-[134] (Lord Dyson). 
18 M. Elliott and R. Thomas, “Tribunal Justice”, above fn. 16, 312. See Cart, above fn. 14, [2011] 
UKSC 28 at [47] (Lady Hale). [89] (Lord Phillips) [100] (Lord Brown), [104] (Lord Clarke), [124]-
[126] (Lord Dyson). 
19 It is notable likewise that the TCEA 2007 was intended to produce a coherent structure for the 
delivery of administrative justice. See: Andrew Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service 
(March 2001), “Terms of Reference”. 
20 Noor v HMRC [2013] UKUT 071 (TCC), [2013] STC 998. 
21 Noor v HMRC, above fn. 20, [2013] UKUT 071 (TCC) at [29], [76]-[78]. 
22 Reed Employment plc and others v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2014] UKUT 160 (TCC) 
[343], [2014] STC 1982, 2068. The Upper Tribunal in British Disabled Flying Association v Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners [2013] UKUT 162 [52], [2013] STC 1677, 1689 also adopted the 
reasoning in Noor v HMRC but without giving reasons for doing so. 
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Appeal in Trustees of BT Pension Scheme v HMRC23 similarly noted that “when one 
of the tax tribunals was intended to be able to determine public law claims Parliament 
made that expressly clear”.24 Indeed, it is a strong argument that as Parliament has not 
provided a key to the front door, it would be inappropriate to imply that one can sneak 
in through the back. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Samarkand Film 
Partnership No. 3 v Revenue and Customs25 also noted that the First-tier Tribunal did 
not have jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness of a possible breach of legitimate 
expectation by HMRC.26 However, it was not argued otherwise by the parties in the 
case and so did not expressly reject Oxfam. 
In brief, the current position is that the First-tier Tax Tribunal may only 
consider public law complaints where a statutory provision allows it to do so. How 
broadly the provisions can be read is the subject of conflicting judgments27 at the 
same level of authority,28 though a restrictive reading has found more favour in recent 
years. 
Reasons to amend the law 
It will be argued in this section that the current constraint on allowing public law 
claims to be heard in the tribunals is overly restrictive. This becomes evident when 
one considers the policy behind this restriction, the competence of the tribunals, the 
practical advantages to loosening the restriction and the arguments against such a 
move. These matters will be considered in turn.  
Policy behind the restriction  
Given that jurisdiction to hear public law claims is governed by statute, it is worth 
considering the reason the primary governing statute TCEA 2007 only allows for the 
tribunals to consider public law issues in limited circumstances. The Leggatt Report,29 
which brought about the formalization of the tribunals regime in 2007, did little to 
elaborate upon why First-tier Tribunals such as the tax tribunal should not be entitled 
to deal with issues of judicial review. The Review notes merely that it was suggested 
in the case of the VAT and Duties Tribunal that it might usefully exercise a judicial 
review function at first instance.30 This was rejected however “[i]f only for reasons of 
the greater complexity of the procedure”.31  
Reason for restricting the scope of the tribunals’ jurisdiction can be found in 
the debates on the underlying Bill in the Houses of Parliament. It was perceived that 
the tribunals lacked sufficient expertise. For instance, at the third reading of the Bill in 
                                                 
23 Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] EWCA Civ 713, 
[2016] STC 66 
24 Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, above fn. 23, [2015] EWCA Civ 713 at [143]. 
25 Samarkand Film Partnership No. 3 & Ors v Revenue and Customs [2017] EWCA Civ 77, [2017] 
STC 926. 
26 Samarkand v Revenue and Customs, above fn. 25, [2017] EWCA Civ 77 at [2]. 
27 It has been claimed that the cases can be reconciled. For instance, in Rotberg v HMRC [2014] 
UKFTT 657 (TC); Garrod v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 0353 (TC). Cf: Sygma Security Systems v HMRC 
[2013] UKFTT 329 (TC). 
28 On which, see: Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2010] UKUT 454 (AAC), [2011] MHLR 37, at 
[40]. 
29 Leggatt Report, above fn. 19. 
30 Leggatt Report, above fn. 19, at [6.8]. 
31 Leggatt Report, above fn. 19, at [6.8]. 
Forthcoming British Tax Review 2018 (pre-publication version) 
 5 
the House of Lords, several members expressed their opinion that judicial review 
should only be exercised by those with expertise in such matters. Lord Campbell 
noted that the exercise of discretion in judicial review cases called for “judicial 
expertise”.32 At the second sitting of the Public Bill Committee, Vera Baird (the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice at the time) acknowledged that the 
purpose of allowing transfers from the High Court to Upper Tribunal in selected cases 
was to “harness the expertise that is likely to be available in that forum on the special 
kinds of business that the tribunal system takes care of”.33 Indeed, in the Explanatory 
Notes to the Act, it is noted that the provision would “allow the parties to have the 
benefit of the specialist expertise of the Upper Tribunal in cases similar to those with 
which the Upper Tribunal routinely deals in the exercise of its statutory appellate 
jurisdiction”.34  
Importantly it is not a requirement that judicial review matters can only be 
considered by the Upper Tribunal where the panel is formed solely of High Court 
judges,35 although there must be one “judge” of the Upper Tribunal sitting in the 
panel.36 “Judges” of the Upper Tribunal are appointed on the recommendation of the 
Lord Chancellor and must have significant experience with the law (such as 7 years of 
practice as a barrister or solicitor).37 As such, what is relevant is expertise in dealing 
with issues of public law, not the particular form of the relevant decision-maker. In 
this respect, an amendment to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill which 
would have meant that cases could be transferred only to the Upper Tribunal where 
the panel consisted only of High Court judges was rejected on the basis that persons 
other than High Court justices can be sufficiently competent to deal with public law 
issues.38 
If the purpose of restricting who can hear judicial review claims is that such 
matters should only be dealt with by the persons properly competent to do so, then it 
follows that the competence of the First-tier Tax Tribunal should be analysed. If it can 
be shown that the body has sufficient expertise to consider public law matters, then 
the rationale for restricting the body’s jurisdiction falls away. 
                                                 
32 HL Deb 20 Feb 2007, vol 689, col 1007. 
33 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill 15 March 2007, col 37. 
34 Explanatory Notes to Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, at [122]. 
35 See Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31A(3). This can be contrasted with TCEA 2007, s. 18(8) where a 
High Court judge must be presiding where there is a judicial review of an unappealable First-tier 
decision (such other persons as may be agreed from time to time between the Lord Chief Justice, the 
Lord President, or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, as the case may be, and the Senior 
President of Tribunals). On which, see: Classes of cases specified under section 18(6) of the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (Practice Direction), s. 2(b). 
36 Composition of Tribunals in relation to matters that fall to be decided by the Tax chamber of the 
First-tier Tribunal and the Finance and Tax Chamber of the Upper Tribunal on or after 1 April 2009 
(Practice Statement), s. 11. 
37 TCEA 2007, Sch. 3, s. 1. 
38 HL Deb 20 Feb 2007, vol 689, cols 1007-1009. 
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Competence of the First-tier Tax Tribunal 
Dr Avery Jones has argued that the First-tier Tax Tribunal ought to be entitled to hear 
public law issues:39 not as a matter of “principle”,40 but rather because the Tribunal 
already hears public law issues.41 This is a strong argument for extending the 
jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal, namely, that the body has the practical expertise 
to consider matters of public law. Indeed, it is this logic that permitted extending the 
jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal to consider cases of judicial review. To this end, if 
it can be shown that the First-tier Tribunal has the requisite expertise, then it should 
be equally permitted to consider judicial review cases. 
Although the classification is not without difficulty,42 it is orthodox to start by 
noting that there are three primary grounds for judicial review when discussing the 
grounds for review: illegality, unreasonableness and procedural impropriety.43 
Proportionality and legitimate expectation are both claims that can be made in judicial 
review proceedings, but whether these are subsumed by the aforementioned three 
primary grounds or constitute their own independent grounds for review is a matter of 
continuing debate.44 In tax cases at least, legitimate expectation claims are generally 
dealt with as an independent ground for review.45 If it can be demonstrated that the 
First-tier Tribunal is already endowed with the jurisdiction to consider issues in 
respect of all the different grounds for review, then it follows that the body has the 
requisite expertise to consider public law issues generally. The article will approach 
this task by demonstrating that the First-tier Tribunal is already endowed with 
responsibility for considering public law issues under the different heads of review. 
Although these heads cover a wide spectrum of potential claims, the important point 
is that under each the critical judicial task is the balancing of public law 
considerations. While the article will only look at a select few examples, it can be 
extrapolated from these that the Tribunal is more generally competent. Finally, it 
should be noted that in his above cited article for the British Tax Review, Dr Avery 
Jones highlighted briefly some provisions where the lower Tribunal may deal with 
                                                 
39 J. F. Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals: a story of uncompleted business” (2006) BTR 
282, 291-293; Avery Jones, “Tax appeals”, above fn. 4, 13. 
40 Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn. 39, 291; Avery Jones, “Tax appeals”, 
above fn. 4, 13. 
41 Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn. 39, 291; Avery Jones, “Tax appeals”, 
above fn. 4, 13. 
42 M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 497. Sarah 
Nason has also proposed a different taxonomy, see: S. Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2016). 
43 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410 (Lord Diplock).  
44 For instance in R. v IRC, ex p Unilever plc [1996] STC 681 it was mooted that legitimate 
expectations claims could be subsumed within the banner of “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. See the 
discussion in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 
1591 on the differences between proportionality and reasonableness.  
45 See, for instance, R. (on the application of Davies and another) v Commissioners for HM Revenue 
and Customs; R. (on the application of Gaines-Cooper v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs 
[2011] UKSC 47; R. (on the application of Cameron) v RCC [2012] EWHC 1174 (Admin), [2012] 
STC 1691; R. (on the application of Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC [2015] EWHC 3261. It should be 
noted that breach of a legitimate expectation does not itself provide a successful claim, it must be 
additionally proved that the breach of the expectation is conspicuously unfair (Unilever, above fn. 44, 
[1996] STC 681, 697 (Simon Brown LJ)) such that it amounts to an abuse of power. In this sense, it 
would be more correct for the courts to use the heading “abuse of power” rather than “legitimate 
expectation”. 
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public law issues.46 This section should in this sense be seen as further developing Dr 
Avery Jones’ argument. 
Illegality 
Illegality is a broad category which encompasses those decisions made by public 
authorities that the bodies did not have authority to do. It applies to situations where 
the decision-maker has used a power for an improper purpose, has taken account of 
irrelevant considerations (or failed to take account of relevant considerations), has 
unlawfully delegated decision-making power, or has fettered her discretion.47 
Importantly, there are statutory provisions which entitle the First-tier Tribunal to 
consider the “illegality” of HMRC actions in respect of these situations. Paragraph 3A 
of Schedule 1AB of the Taxes Management Act 1970 for instance sets out the 
requirements for a claim to “special relief” (a claim for repayment of tax more than 
four years after the end of the relevant tax year). HMRC is not required to repay the 
tax unless three conditions are satisfied,48 Condition A of which is relevant for present 
purposes. This is that “in the opinion of the Commissioners it would be 
unconscionable for the Commissioners to seek to recover the amount”. This requires 
the Tribunal to take account of judicial review principles,49 including whether the 
Commissioners’ discretionary power has been used for an improper purpose.50 
Meanwhile, section 16(4) of the Finance Act 1994 requires the Tribunal to ascertain 
whether irrelevant considerations have been taken into account when assessing the 
reasonableness of an HMRC Officer refusing to restore seized goods.51 
Unreasonableness 
Where litigants attempt to challenge the “reasonableness” of decisions in judicial 
review proceedings, their challenge goes more towards the merits of a particular 
decision. In relation to this ground, the First-tier Tribunal is given jurisdiction by 
various statutory provisions to assess the “reasonableness” of HMRC actions. Section 
16(4) of the Finance Act 1994 permits the Tribunal to consider whether the refusal by 
an Officer of the UK Border Force (following a review) to restore items seized at the 
border was a decision which “could not reasonably have arrived at”.52 Elsewhere, 
section 83(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 in certain circumstances allows the 
Tribunal to assess the reasonableness with which HMRC has exercised its statutory 
discretion. By way of background, a taxable person is not entitled to input tax credit 
                                                 
46 Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn. 39, 291, footnote 54; Avery Jones, “Tax 
appeals”, above fn. 4, 13, footnote 42. 
47 Turpin and Tomkins, above fn. 5, 669-677. 
48 Taxes Management Act 1970, Schedule 1AB, para 3A (3). 
49 See Pegasus Birds v Customs & Excise Commissioners [1999] STC 95, 101. 
50 Donald Fitzroy Currie v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 882 (TC), at [29]. See also Qualapharm Limited v 
HMRC [2016] UKFTT 100 (TC), at [42] where it is speculated that the Tribunal could consider 
whether a penalty has been issued for an “improper purpose”. 
51 Lindsay v Customs & Excise Commissioners [2002] EWCA Civ 267, at [40] (Lord Phillips). See 
also: Customs & Excise Commissioners v JH Corbitt (Numismatists) Ltd [1981] AC 22, 40 (Lord 
Lane). 
52 On which, see Juliet Forster-Copperi v Director of Border Revenue [2016] UKFTT 157 (TC); Bakht 
v Director of Border Revenue [2014] UKFTT 551 (TC); Brian Talbot v Director of Border Revenue 
[2012] UKFTT 381 (TC). 
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unless that person holds a tax invoice. However, the Commissioners have a statutory 
discretion to allow credit for input tax notwithstanding that the registered person does 
not hold such a tax invoice.53 The First-tier Tribunal has supervisory jurisdiction to 
review the reasonableness of the exercise of this discretion.54 
Procedural Impropriety 
The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 made a considerable change to the public law 
landscape by allowing litigants to take cases in UK courts considering infringements 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). By virtue of section 3 of the 
HRA 1998, primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with Convention rights. As Mosedale J has noted: 
“The effect of this is that primary and secondary legislation must be 
read in so far as possible as consistent with the Convention. This goes 
well beyond giving legislation a purposive interpretation: the 
legislation must be read as consistent with the Convention if at all 
possible to do so”55 
Importantly, this requires the First-tier Tribunal to construe legislation in light of 
Article 6 of the ECHR which applies to administrative proceedings that determine the 
“civil rights and obligations [of an individual] or of any criminal charge against him”. 
In such a case, the person concerned is “entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal”. Article 6 also guarantees 
minimum rights for those persons charged with a criminal offence, such as to be 
informed in detail and promptly of the nature and scope of the accusation. These 
obligations overlap (and at times extend)56 those required at common law in respect of 
procedural propriety. To this end, Article 6 imposes procedural fairness requirements 
upon certain acts of HMRC which are in turn subject to the jurisdiction of the First-
tier Tribunal. Cases in which procedural impropriety issues through the median of 
Article 6 have been raised include Aqua Products Limited v HMRC57 (whether a thirty 
day time limit in which to appeal infringes appellant’s Convention rights), Lindsay 
Hackett v HMRC58 (whether HMRC’s decision to proceed by way of personal liability 
notice infringed Article 6), Mr D v HMRC59 (whether a Tribunal hearing should be in 
camera), and Westminster College of Computing v HMRC60 (whether a failure to give 
a taxpayer sufficient time to prepare his case amounted to an infringement of Article 
6). 
                                                 
53 See Kohanzad v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1994] STC 697, 969 (Schiemann J) on how 
to interpret Regulation 29(2) of the Value Added Tax Regulations 1995. 
54 Kohanzad v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1994] STC 697; Best Buys v HMRC [2011] 
UKUT 497 (TCC), at [49]-[50], [2012] STC 885, at [49]-[50]. 
55 LH Bishop v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC), at [190]. 
56 H. William Wade and Christopher F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014), 405. 
57 Aqua Products Limited v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 340 (TC). 
58 Lindsay Hackett v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 781 (TC). 
59 Mr D v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 850 (TC). 
60 Westminster College of Computing v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 669 (TC). 
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Proportionality 
Proportionality may be either a distinct ground for judicial review, or may be largely 
subsumed within “reasonableness”. What is uncontroversial is that proportionality 
analysis will be engaged where EU law or ECHR rights are concerned. In de Freitas v 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Housing,61 the test for 
proportionality was formulated as follows:  
"whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the 
legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means 
used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective."62 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to briefly note that the Tribunal must engage in 
proportionality analysis when considering the purported infringement of rights under 
the ECHR.63 The Tribunal must also engage in proportionality analysis in respect of 
EU law.64  
Legitimate Expectation 
Lord Carnwath in the recent Privy Council case of The United Policyholders v 
Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago65 surveyed the cases concerning the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations and the accompanying academic commentary 
before summarising the doctrine as follows: 
“Where a promise or representation, which is “clear, unambiguous and 
devoid of relevant qualification”, has been given to an identifiable 
defined person or group by a public authority for its own purposes, 
either in return for action by the person or group, or on the basis of 
which the person or group has acted to its detriment, the court will 
require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able to show good 
reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it. In 
judging proportionality the court will take into account any conflict 
with wider policy issues, particularly those of a “macro-economic” or 
“macro-political” kind.”66 
                                                 
61 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69. 
62 de Freitas, above fn. 61, [1999] 1 AC 69, 80. 
63 See for instance Trinity Mirror v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 355 (TC); Rockliff v Her Majesty's Revenue 
& Customs [2009] UKFTT 162 (TC). 
64 For instance, see: Highland Wood Energy v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 420 (TC); Imperial v HMRC 
[2015] UKFTT 0033 (TC). 
65 The United Policyholders Group and others v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 
UKPC 17, [2016] WLR 3383. 
66 United Policyholders, above n 61, [2016] UKPC 17 at [121] (Lord Carnwath). 
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 Although the First-tier Tribunal has no “general supervisory jurisdiction”67 
and hence cannot generally hear legitimate expectation cases, there are nevertheless 
circumstances where it can consider issues which usually come within the ambit of 
that doctrine. In Spring Salmon v HMRC68 for instance, the First-tier Tribunal 
considered whether HMRC was prevented from pursuing tax due owing to a prior 
agreement between the taxpayer and HMRC. The First-tier Tribunal ultimately held 
against the taxpayer on the point, finding that there was no agreement which arose 
upon which the taxpayer could rely.69 However, the Tribunal adopted the same 
approach which would be taken when considering claims under the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation. The Tribunal approached the issue by looking at three separate 
facets: the terms of any agreement, whether the conditions of such an agreement had 
been satisfied, and whether the agreement was implemented.70 In the language of 
legitimate expectations, this would equate to asking whether there was a 
representation made which was clear, unambiguous and devoid of qualification upon 
which the taxpayer could and did rely. In rejecting the claim, the Tribunal used 
language which is to be found in legitimate expectation cases, noting that the 
assurance by HMRC was “guarded” and “qualified” thereby preventing an agreement 
from arising.71  
Further, the analysis which was deployed in respect of the ECHR in relation to 
“Procedural Impropriety” above72 can be used here to demonstrate that the First-tier 
Tribunal may consider legitimate expectations in certain circumstances. Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the ECHR protects the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”, 
within which a claim for a substantive legitimate expectation can be made. A 
legitimate expectation claim must be incidental to a property right in order for it to 
garner the protection of the First Protocol.73 Thus, if a property right is present,74 for 
instance such as a right to recover input tax,75 a claim to a legitimate expectation can 
be considered by the First-tier Tribunal.76  
Practical advantages to loosening the restriction 
Having identified that the policy behind restricting the ability of the First-tier Tribunal 
to consider public law matters is on the basis of expertise, and having established that 
the body is competent to adjudicate on such issues, it still needs to be established 
what exactly would be the benefit to broadening the jurisdiction of the First-tier 
Tribunal. Primarily, it is that it would no longer be necessary to maintain two separate 
proceedings dealing with different sides or aspects of the same case. This has 
                                                 
67 See: Revenue and Customs Comrs v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) [36], [41], [2013] STC 225, 
234, 235; Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), 712; Noor v HMRC, above fn. 20, [2013] 
UKUT 071 (TCC), at [30]. 
68 Spring Salmon v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC).  
69 Spring Salmon, above fn. 68, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [258]-[270]. 
70 Spring Salmon, above fn. 68, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [259]. 
71 Spring Salmon, above fn. 68, [2014] UKFTT 887 (TC) at [263]. 
72 See “Procedural Impropriety” in text at fn. 54 onwards.  
73 Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (42527/98) [2001] ECHR 463, at [83]. 
74 See R. (Carvill) v IRC (No2) [2003] STC 1539, at [49]. 
75 On which, see: Bulves AD v Bulgaria (3991/03) [2009] ECHR 143; Aleena Electronics Ltd v 
Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 608 (TC), at [38]-[44]. 
76 What amounts to a possession for tax purposes was recently considered by Lord Justice McCombe in 
R. (on the application of Rowe and Vital Nut) v HMRC [2017] EWCA Civ 2105, at [158]-[185]. 
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important practical advantages and can also be supported by an argument based on 
deference.  
Fundamentally then, the great advantage of this proposal is that it would dispel 
with the need for two proceedings considering different aspects of the same case. 
There is a “clear public benefit” in allowing the Tribunal to consider public law points 
as it is well-positioned to make judgments about the fair treatment of taxpayers and 
this reduces cost, delay, potential injustice and confusion.77 Having the one tribunal 
hear arguments on two separate points, one going to substance and the other going to 
public law concerns, allows the Tribunal to consider whether findings of fact are 
necessary for determining both points, or whether a finding on one point will vitiate 
the need to make a finding on the other. As noted by Lord Justice Hughes (as he then 
was) in Davies v Revenue and Customs:78 “it is undoubtedly good general practice to 
ensure, so far as possible, that a challenge in law by way of judicial review is 
mounted on the basis of known facts”.79 The Tribunal can also apply its expertise in 
deciding which issues ought to be resolved first, as the resolution of one may render 
resolution of the other redundant!80 This would avoid precisely the situation which 
arose in the joined cases of Davies and Gaines-Cooper.81 In the Supreme Court, two 
sets of judicial review proceedings were heard together. The procedural history of the 
two however was quite distinct. The first appellants had stayed the substantive 
hearing until after the judicial review whilst the second appellant had pursued the 
substantive appeal and thereafter instituted judicial review proceedings. Given that a 
successful judicial review would render the investment of time and resources by the 
Revenue in challenging the substantive case redundant, Lord Wilson labelled it 
“unfortunate” that the course taken in the case of the first appellants was not taken in 
the case of the second.82 At the same time, hearing the substantive appeal first would 
also pre-empt and for all intents and purposes determine the outcome of the judicial 
review proceedings, as Lord Justice Hughes noted in Davies v Revenue and 
Customs.83 
The prudence of extending the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal to 
consider issues of public law where they are relevant to resolving a dispute is 
particularly present today. HMRC has acquired a series of novel powers which seek 
to nudge taxpayers away from tax avoidance activities and also away from delaying 
the collection of tax by engaging in litigation. Crucially, where these are challenged 
by taxpayers, there may also be an underlying dispute about how the underlying 
substantive law applies to the relevant facts.84 This in turn would render it prudent to 
have one forum consider both sets of issues. For instance, consider the introduction of 
                                                 
77 Oxfam, above fn. 9, [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), at [70]. 
78 Davies v Revenue and Customs [2008] EWCA Civ 933. 
79 Davies v Revenue and Customs, above fn. 78, [2008] EWCA Civ 933, at [7]. 
80 On which, see: Reed Employment v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 596 (TC), at [18]-[27], in particular at 
[24]. 
81 Gaines-Cooper, above fn. 45, [2011] UKSC 47. 
82 Gaines-Cooper, above fn. 45, [2011] UKSC 47, at [6]. 
83 Davies v Revenue and Customs, above fn. 78, [2008] EWCA Civ 933, at [17]-[18]. 
84 In addition to Accelerated Payment Notices (and Partner Payment Notices), one could also consider 
Follower Notices, the General Anti-Abuse Rule and its penalty regime, and the Serial Avoiders 
Scheme. The Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Scheme and Promoters of Tax Avoidance Scheme rules are 
also a means of nudging in this manner particularly when used as a proxy for determining whether 
notices (Accelerated, Partner or Follower) requiring the upfront payment of tax should be issued. A 
recent discussion paper from the IFS helpfully highlights the development of these “new” regulatory 
powers. See: Tracey Bowler, “The implications of recent additions to HMRC powers and the shifting 
balance in the relationship with taxpayers” (Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2017). 
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Accelerated Payment Notices (APNs). The APN regime broadly requires that 
taxpayers pay disputed tax upfront, before being able to challenge HMRC’s 
assessment through the normal channels. APNs may be issued where the following 
conditions are present:85 
 
1. Either an enquiry or appeal are in progress; 
2. A tax advantage accrues from the particular arrangements; and 
3. A follower notice has been issued;86 the arrangements are DOTAS 
notifiable;87 or a GAAR counteraction notice has been issued88 
 
Once an APN has been issued to the taxpayer, the money becomes payable within 90 
days.89 There is no right of appeal against the APN, but merely the right to make 
representations to HMRC, as a means only of objecting to either the satisfaction of the 
conditions or to the amount submitted to be due.90 After taking into account the 
representations, HMRC may refuse to withdraw the APN.91 If an APN has been 
issued to a taxpayer who entered into the once seemingly popular film schemes, the 
amount due could well be into the hundreds of thousands of pounds.92 Taxpayers are 
left with little option but to fight the APN, but without any right of appeal against the 
APN available, the only route which can be taken is through the Administrative 
Court. Partner Payment Notices (PPNs) are almost identical to APNs but apply to 
parties who have invested through partnerships.93  
As of March 2017, 87 judicial review applications had been launched in 
relation to APNs and PPNs, with 4,116 applicants or potential applicants seeking 
interim relief from APNs/PPNs which HMRC's records show amounted to a total sum 
in excess of £756m.94 Importantly for the purposes of this article, these judicial 
review applications relate to cases where there is additionally a substantive dispute 
between the parties,95 with the likelihood that many would proceed to the FTT by way 
of appeal. Crucially there must be genuine substance to HMRC’s claim for tax. In R. 
(on the application of Rowe and Vital Nut v HMRC),96 the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that an APN or PPN could not be issued anytime that a scheme had been notified 
under DOTAS. Rather, such a notice could only be issued where HMRC had been 
positively satisfied that the scheme notified under DOTAS would also be 
ineffective.97 This was because the amount of tax that must be paid upfront, known as 
the “disputed tax”, is to be determined by a designated officer in HMRC using the 
                                                 
85 Finance Act 2014, s. 219. 
86 See Finance Act 2014, s. 204. 
87 See Finance Act 2003, s. 311. 
88 See Finance Act 2013, Schedule 43, para 12. 
89 Finance Act 2014, ss. 223(4) and 223(5). Where representations have been made, this can have the 
effect of delaying the date for repayment by up to 30days. 
90 Finance Act 2014, s. 222. 
91 Finance Act 2014, s. 222(4). 
92 See for instance: Adam Palin, “Tax schemes: HMRC urged to stop bankrupting investors” Financial 
Times (London, 20 November 2015). 
93 See Finance Act 2014, s. 228 and Schedule 32. See also HMRC, Compliance checks series – 
CC/FS24, 1, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/580530/CC-FS24-11-
16.pdf [Accessed 31 December 2017]. 
94 R (VVB Engineering Services Ltd & Ors) v HMRC [2017] EWHC 506 (Admin), at [10].  
95 See Finance Act 2014, s. 219 and paragraph 2 of Schedule 32. 
96 Rowe and Vital Nut, above fn. 76, [2017] EWCA Civ 2105. 
97 Rowe and Vital Nut, above fn. 76, [2017] EWCA Civ 2105, at [62] and [220]. 
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“best of the officer’s information and belief”.98 The Court of Appeal read this as 
requiring positive satisfaction as to the ineffectiveness of the underlying scheme.99 
Thus, it is necessary for the court to make a determination as to whether there 
is merit in HMRC’s claim that the tax is due. With APNs accordingly, there is a clear 
case for allowing the First-tier Tribunal to consider the merits of a public law point. It 
will be hearing the substantive dispute at any rate, but also importantly, findings of 
fact can lead to the resolution of both disputes. Given the interdependence of the 
issues, it would be prudent in such a case to extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
allow it to consider the public law issues.100 The Tribunal could exercise its expertise 
to decide which issues ought to be resolved first.101 
The justification for extending the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal where 
there is a substantive dispute may also be buttressed by an argument based on 
“deference”. One of the most basic purposes of administrative law is the allocation of 
responsibility for decision-making. The role of the court in judicial review is 
generally not to decide what the correct decision should be. It is to decide upon 
whether the processes that led to that decision were proper.102 This does not prevent 
the courts entirely from intruding upon the merits of a decision, some decisions are 
unreasonable for instance and may be overturned.103 But the degree to which the 
courts may intervene in respect of the merits of a decision is controlled by the 
principle of deference: that the courts should defer to the decision arrived at by the 
official or entity vested with the decision-making power. As Endicott points out,104 
this process of not second-guessing decisions is justified on the basis of the legal 
allocation of power (that officials, and not the courts, have been vested with the 
power by a sovereign Parliament), expertise (the official will be institutionally 
competent to take the decision), political responsibility (the processes for political 
accountability for decisions will be established in the case of the official) and 
processes (courts are constrained by rules of judicial process, such as rules on 
evidence, as to what factors are relevant for a decision, whereas the primary decision-
maker will have greater resources and capabilities for information, and will be more 
attuned accordingly to the relevant information).  
This idea of deference to decision-makers however is turned on its head in the 
case of the First-tier Tribunal which is a body staffed with tax experts acutely attuned 
to the vagaries of HMRC actions. Dealing with Endicott’s four concerns: (i) The 
                                                 
98 Finance Act 2014, s. 221(3) and paragraph 4 of Schedule 32. 
99 This overturned the onus of proof established by the High Court in R. (on the application of Vital 
Nut) v HMRC [2016] EWHC 1797 (Admin), at [35], [2016] 4 WLR 144. 
100 The same case can be made in respect for instance of the operation of the Diverted Profits Tax 
(DPT), which aims to counteract contrived arrangements used by large groups that result in the erosion 
of the UK tax base (Explanatory notes to Finance Act 2015, s. 77). As with the APN regime, taxpayers 
are required to pay disputed tax upfront where a Charging Notice has been issued pursuant to the DPT 
provisions (see generally: Finance Act 2015, Part 3) and similarly, it is a prerequisite to the issuance of 
a notice that the relevant HMRC believes tax to be due as a matter of substantive law (on this, see: for 
instance R. (on the application of Glencore) v Revenue and Customs [2017] EWCA Civ 1716, at [73]-
[78], [2017] WLR(D) 723). To this end, there is a substantive tax law dispute in addition to a potential 
judicial review claim, where the determination in the former would be an important factor in the 
resolution of the latter. 
101 On which, see: Hankinson v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 384 (TC) [114]-[115]. 
102 Council of Civil Service Unions, above fn. 43, [1985] ICR 14, 28-29 (Lord Fraser), 33-34 (Lord 
Scarman) 39 (Lord Diplock), 41-42 (Lord Roskill), 50-51 (Lord Brightman).  
103 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223. See also 
Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 31(5A) which allows a judge to remake a quashed decision 
104 Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 234-236.  
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Tribunal has been legally allocated power to adjudicate upon disputes concerning 
HMRC and taxpayers. (ii) It has unique institutional competence and expertise. (iii) 
HMRC is a non-ministerial governmental body which is lacking in oversight 
mechanisms, which has been articulated elsewhere.105 Broadening the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal would then in fact enhance the accountability of HMRC and its staff. (iv) 
The First-tier Tribunal adjudicates disputes de novo and as such does step into the 
shoes of the primary decision-maker, equipped with all the relevant information to 
arrive at a decision. That the Tribunal satisfies these conditions is in fact another 
reason why the body ought to be extended the opportunity to consider public law 
issues. 
Counterarguments  
Having established a positive case for extending the jurisdiction of the First-tier 
Tribunal, it is worth considering the counterarguments. A potential reason for 
restricting the ability to hear public law claims is the problem of “complexity”, which 
was highlighted in the Leggatt Report. The formalisation of the tribunals’ regime was 
intended to introduce a clear, streamlined approach to appeals through the tribunals.106 
Allowing public law claims to be raised in the First-tier Tax Tribunal only, but not in 
for instance the Immigration or Employment Tribunals, undermines this consistency 
and adds complexity. In response, the status quo already creates unnecessary 
complexity for the ordinary taxpayer who may have to participate in two separate sets 
of proceedings in different courts. Furthermore, this objection overlooks the point that 
some public law claims can already be brought in the First-tier Tribunal.107  
A second counterargument is that there is already a mechanism for having one 
tribunal, namely the Upper Tribunal, consider all matters, both substantive and public 
law points, relevant to the resolution of a dispute between HMRC and the taxpayer. 
The judicial review case can be transferred from the Administrative Court to the 
Upper Tribunal, whilst the substantive appeal can be transferred from the First-tier 
Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal.108 This argument however neglects the fact that the 
First-tier Tribunal is expert at making determinations on facts, whilst appeal to the 
Upper Tribunal traditionally lies only on points of law. The proposal here is to 
broaden the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal where there is a substantive dispute, 
which in turn requires determinations of fact. Although the Upper Tribunal can make 
factual determinations, and indeed High Court judges often hear witness actions, it is 
the First-tier Tribunal which is more expertly constituted to make such 
determinations. In this sense, the counterargument that the Upper Tribunal could 
hypothetically hear both the judicial review case and the substantive case misses a 
critical component of this proposal. Disputes should be resolved in the forum best 
placed to do so, and in this case, that is the First-tier Tribunal. 
                                                 
105 S. Daly, “Oversight of HMRC Soft Law: Lessons from the Ombudsman” (2016) 38(3) Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law 343. 
106 See for instance Leggatt Report, above fn. 19, at [6.2]. 
107 It is notable also that the scope of the First-tier Tribunal’s jurisdiction still confuses members of the 
Administrative Court. See: S. Daly, “Fairness in tax law and revenue guidance: R. (Hely-Hutchinson) v 
HMRC” (2016) 1 BTR 18, 20. 
108 Rule 28 of the First-tier Tax Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 allows for a transfer of a “complex 
case” with the permission of the parties. 
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A third more powerful counterargument relates to practicality. Tribunals are 
intended to be, inter alia, quicker, cheaper and more informal than the courts.109 
Allowing judicial review claims wholesale would place an extreme burden upon the 
tribunal system. The ability to petition for judicial review is restricted quite heavily 
generally by virtue of a filtering system which imposes a significant threshold before 
a claim may proceed. As set out by Judge Mosedale in LH Bishop v HMRC,110 
Parliament cannot have intended for challenges to, effectively, the fairness of a 
provision to be brought in an unrestricted manner.111 By limiting such claims to 
judicial review, and therein having a permission filter to weed out unmeritorious 
claims, it could be said that there is merit in preventing the Tribunal from hearing 
public law issues without limit.112 Again, this argument also misses the point of this 
proposal. It is not intended that the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal should be 
extended generally to consider public law issues. It is only that the First-tier Tribunal 
should be entitled to consider public law issues where it relates to an additional 
substantive dispute. If the claim on the public law issue is unmeritorious, the Tribunal 
can easily dismiss it when considering the other issues. The proposal then would not 
place any significant additional burden upon the Tribunal. In this sense, all that 
remains of this objection is that there would be an augmentation of taxpayers’ access 
to justice in respect of protecting against impropriety on HMRC’s part. That however 
is a good thing.  
A fourth related contention would be that extending the scope of the First-tier 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction in such a manner creates a sort of tax “opt-out” whereby the 
ordinary procedural rules of judicial review, such as that judicial review proceedings 
must be instituted within 90 days of the relevant decision,113 do not apply. But again, 
this proposal only seeks to extend jurisdiction where there is a substantive dispute. In 
this scenario, if there is a good claim in judicial review, it infects HMRC’s argument. 
For instance, where there is a dispute about whether tax is due, the taxpayer’s 
argument may be that tax is not due both in law and because she had a legitimate 
expectation based upon an express assurance from HMRC. HMRC’s claim that tax is 
due accordingly, even if in terms of the substantive tax law this is correct, could fail 
because of a public law claim.114 That tax could be due or not is a matter of public law 
and substantive tax law. The two are inextricably linked. That HMRC should be able 
to claim tax that is not due simply because of the expiration of a restrictive time limit 
is unfair. It should further be recalled that some public law issues can already be 
heard at the First-tier Tribunal. In this sense, there is already a sort of tax “opt-out”. 
Moreover, it should be noted that taxpayers must generally appeal HMRC decisions 
within 30days.115 If a taxpayer is seeking to appeal a decision of HMRC, the public 
                                                 
109 M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 687; 
Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Cmnd 218, 1959), at [38]. 
110 LH Bishop v HMRC, above fn. 55, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC). 
111 LH Bishop v HMRC, above fn. 55, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC), at [143]-[146]. 
112 LH Bishop v HMRC, above fn. 55, [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC), at [143]-[146]. 
113 Civil Procedure Rule 54.5. 
114 Though significant hurdles would remain. See: Davies v Revenue and Customs, above fn. 78, [2008] 
EWCA Civ 933, at [18]. 
115 See for instance Taxes Management Act 1970, s. 31A(b). More generally, on timings in direct tax 
disputes, see: HMRC, Reviews and appeals for direct taxes: Appealing against a decision: Customer 
does not reply to the decision within the time limits (10 August 2016), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/appeals-reviews-and-tribunals-guidance/artg2220 
[Accessed 31 December 2017]. On indirect tax disputes, see: HMRC, Reviews and appeals for indirect 
taxes: Appealing against a decision or assessment: Time limit for making an appeal (10 August 2016), 
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law ground that she may additionally seek to pursue will generally relate to that 
decision. In this sense, the taxpayer will likely come within the 90 day rule anyway.  
Finally, it is tempting to argue that there is something intrinsically superior 
about the ability of the higher courts to consider public law issues.116 In response, it is 
worth noting that the Lord Chief Justice, when the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement 
Bill was being scrutinised by Parliament, rejected the idea that only High Court 
judges have the requisite knowledge to consider issues of public law.117 Indeed 
Baroness Ashton in the House of Lords supported the Lord Chief Justice’s view, 
particularly given the expertise which is espoused by members of the tax tribunals.118 
Furthermore, the courts too are liable to misconceive public law issues. In the case of 
R. (on the application of Ingenious Media) v HMRC, HMRC defended disclosures of 
confidential taxpayers’ information on the basis that such actions fell within its 
managerial discretion.119 This was accepted by the High Court120 and unanimously by 
the Court of Appeal,121 but rejected thereafter unanimously by the Supreme Court.122 
Lord Toulson, giving the only judgment of the Court, remarked that the “whole idea 
of HMRC officials supplying confidential information about individuals to the media 
on a non-attributable basis is, or should be, a matter of serious concern”123 and 
regarded the justifications for HMRC’s actions, which were accepted by the High 
Court and Court of Appeal, “as far too tenuous to justify”124 disclosing 
confidential information. 
The mechanics of the proposed reform 
Having established the case for extending the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax 
Tribunal to consider public law points where there is an additional substantial dispute, 
the remaining matter relates to how this reform would operate. There are three 
potential avenues which could be explored. The first, narrow, option is that the rules 
could be amended such that the High Court could transfer a judicial review case to the 
First-tier Tribunal where the Court considers that it would be “just and convenient” to 
do so.125 In considering whether it would be so, the Court could then look to the 
aforementioned advantages where there is a substantive dispute ongoing and the fact 
that the First-tier Tribunal is well-equipped to deal with public law issues. The rules 
                                                 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/appeals-reviews-and-tribunals-
guidance/artg3120 [Accessed 31 December 2017]. 
116 Note however that even the Magistrate’s Court may consider public law issues. See Pawlowski v 
Dunnington [1999] WL 250041, [1999] STC 550. On which, see: John Tiley and Glen Loutzenhiser, 
Revenue Law, 8th edn (Bloomsbury 2016), 79. 
117 Letter from 7 February 2007 to Baroness Ashton in relation to amendment tabled by Lords Lloyd 
and Kingsland to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill. See: HL Deb 20 Feb 2007, vol 689, col 
1009. 
118 HL Deb 20 Feb 2007, vol 689, col 1009. 
119 See: S. Daly, “Public disclosures and HMRC’s duty of confidentiality: R. (Ingenious Media) v 
HMRC” (2017) 1 BTR 101. 
120 R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and another) v HMRC [2013] EWHC 3258 (Admin), 
[2014] STC 673.  
121 R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and another) v HMRC [2015] EWCA Civ 173, [2015] 
STC 1357. 
122 R. (on the application of Ingenious Media and another) v HMRC [2016] UKSC 54, [2016] 1 WLR 
4164.  
123 Ingenious Media, above fn. 122, [2016] UKSC 54 at [35]. 
124 Ingenious Media, above fn. 122, [2016] UKSC 54 at [34]. 
125 See Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31A(3). 
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would also have to be amended so that the First-tier Tribunal could offer the same 
remedies that the Upper Tribunal can now grant in relation to judicial review 
applications.126 The problem with this amendment is that taxpayers would still have to 
commence separate judicial review proceedings in the High Court, thereby imposing 
additional costs on the taxpayer.127   
The second, more radical option is to amend the grounds upon which an 
appeal to the First-tier Tribunal can be made. The proposal in this article is not a 
wholesale extension of jurisdiction, but merely seeks to allow taxpayers to make 
public law arguments in the First-tier Tribunal where there is additionally a 
substantive dispute. The parameters of this proposal are accordingly defined by two 
important restrictions. The first is that there must have been an “appealable decision” 
of HMRC128 against which the claimant is formally appealing and the second is that 
the public law claim is additional to a substantive ground of appeal. In this instance, 
thus, the case would potentially collapse on the resolution of either dispute as in the 
ESC A19 example in the introduction. If there is only a public law claim, the taxpayer 
must take their case through the usual routes, either via Internal Review, the quasi-
judicial path of the Adjudicator’s Office and then Parliamentary Ombudsman, or 
through judicial review through the courts. Practically, this proposal would require 
legislative amendment of a number of provisions which provide for appeals to the 
Tribunal.129 Whilst this would be straightforward in the case of some taxes, such as 
VAT130 and Inheritance Tax131 where appeal is provided for in a single provision, 
appeal rights are more spread out across the provisions in respect of other taxes.132 
Finally, in relation to the practicalities of this proposal, it needs to be specified that 
the First-tier Tribunal will act in a supervisory capacity when deciding upon public 
law points, and thus cannot substitute its own decision for that of HMRC.133 This is in 
keeping with the role of the courts generally in respect of judicial review. An 
amendment will need to be made to TCEA 2007 so as to clarify that the First-tier 
Tribunal may only offer those remedies that can be provided by the courts generally 
in judicial review proceedings. Helpfully, section 15(1) of TCEA 2007 sets out these 
remedies. 
                                                 
126 TCEA 2007, s. 15(1). 
127 On this point, see: Memorandum submitted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) (TRI 11) to the Public Bill Committee (March 2007), at [22] available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/tribunals/memos/ucm1102.htm 
[Accessed 31 December 2017]; Memorandum submitted by the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group 
(LITRG) (TRI 10) to the Public Bill Committee (March 2007) available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/tribunals/memos/ucm1002.htm 
accessed 31 December 2017. See also: Tracey Bowler, “Countering tax avoidance in the UK: which 
way forward?” (Institute for Fiscal Studies, February 2009), at [7.9]. 
128 A condition proposed also by Avery Jones, see Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, 
above fn. 39, 262. 
129 For an overview of the types of appeals that may be brought before the First-tier Tribunal, see: HM 
Courts & Tribunals Service, First-tier Tribunal Tax Chamber Making an appeal Explanatory leaflet 
(March 2015), 10, available at: http://formfinder.hmctsformfinder.justice.gov.uk/t242-eng.pdf 
[Accessed 31 December 2017]. 
130 Value Added Tax Act 1994, s. 83. 
131 Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 222. 
132 The right to appeal income tax decisions for instance is spread out over multiple Acts! 
133 In practice in tax cases, the effect is almost indistinguishable. Where HMRC loses a judicial review, 
the decision is remitted back to be considered again in light of the error highlighted in the review. It is 
the practical effect of the error that will generally be the reason for the dispute. With the error 
eliminated, the dispute is resolved thus in the taxpayer’s favour. 
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Of course, given the judgment in Cart, as argued above, it might well be the 
case that there is no need for legislative amendment in order to pursue this particular 
option. Legislative amendment however is more preferable as this could better tease 
out procedural issues such as the remedies that are available and the capacity in which 
the court ought to act. Moreover, practically, it could be many years before a court of 
sufficient authority, namely the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, would consider 
the matter and set out definitively the circumstances in which the public law issues 
can be heard in the First-tier Tribunal. 
The third and favoured proposal is a combination of both of the above. The 
High Court should be given the discretion to transfer cases to the First-tier Tribunal 
where it believes this to be just and equitable, and that public law claims can be 
adjoined to substantive claims. The reason that both proposals should be adopted is 
that a lacuna is created between the two in the case of regulatory actions by HMRC 
which are interrelated but nevertheless distinct from substantive disputes. For 
instance, APNs are issued where there is a substantive dispute. The claim that the 
APN ought not to have been issued is separate to the claim that the tax is not due in 
the first place. So whilst the claims both relate to the same dispute, there is no 
additional claim in public law that the tax is not due. For this reason, it would be 
necessary for the judicial review proceedings to be transferred from the High Court.  
This is different to the ESC A19 example given in the introduction where the case 
would collapse on the resolution of either dispute in favour of the taxpayer.  
Finally, it must be questioned why there should even need to be, as envisaged 
by this proposal, a substantive dispute before the taxpayer is entitled to take public 
law points in the Tribunal? It has been argued in this article that the Tribunal is 
competent to adjudicate on matters ordinarily reserved to the courts on judicial 
review. The specific mischief that this proposal addresses however is the duplication 
and waste of having to take two separate cases to deal with one dispute. Where a 
taxpayer’s only contention is that there is a public law infringement, then the ordinary 
routes (internal review, the Adjudicator’s Office, the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
and/or the Administrative Court) are appropriate. The piece has not argued that there 
is some inadequacy in relation to these. As noted elsewhere, the Adjudicator’s Office 
and Parliamentary Ombudsman are important tools in remedying HMRC 
indiscretions.134 Although the high cost of judicial review proceedings will often be a 
significant deterrent to taxpayers,135 this is more to do with legal fees rather than court 
fees, the solutions to both of which lie in legal aid or remission of court fees136 and 
not in extending the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
It is unfortunate that the extension of the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax Tribunal has 
not yet come to pass, particularly given that it is over a decade since Dr Avery Jones 
expressed the hope that the British Tax Review would “not still be publishing articles 
on tribunal reform in 25 years’ time”.137 This article has sought to make the case that 
                                                 
134 Daly, “Oversight of HMRC Soft-Law”, above fn. 105. 
135 William Bourne v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 294 (TC) [24]. Whilst both sides to a dispute in the First-
tier Tribunal generally bear their own costs (cf Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) 
Rules 2009, Rule 10), the general rule for Judicial Review is that the losing party pays the costs, (CPR 
44.3(2)). 
136 Civil Proceedings (Fees) Order 2008, Sch 2. 
137 Avery Jones, “The reform of the tax tribunals”, above fn. 39, 293. 
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the time for reform is nigh. It is proposed that the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tax 
Tribunal should be extended to allow the body to consider public law matters. The 
justification is fourfold: first that the underlying policy does not exclude the 
possibility that the Tribunal should be given jurisdiction; secondly that the Tribunal is 
indeed competent in the vagaries of judicial review; thirdly that there is a clear, 
positive case for the proposal; and finally that there are no counterarguments which 
undermine the case for the extension of jurisdiction. 
The reform itself should combine two forms. The first is that the 
Administrative Court would have discretion to transfer judicial review cases to the 
First-tier Tax Tribunal, just as it has in respect of the Upper Tribunal, where there is 
substantive dispute. The second is that the First-tier Tribunal should be entitled to 
hear public law claims where there is an additional ground of appeal with the result 
that the case would collapse on the resolution of either dispute. Of course, a final 
option is that nothing could be changed and we could wait a further 13 years for Dr 
Avery Jones’ hopeful prediction to become defeated.  
 
